Introduction 36
A Bayes factor is a form of statistical inference in which one model, say H1, is pitted against 37 another, say H0. Both models need to be specified, even if in a default way. Significance testing 38 (using only the p-value for inference, as per Fisher, 1935) involves setting up a model for H0 alone -39 and yet is typically still used to pit H0 against H1. I will argue that significance testing is in this way 40 flawed, with harmful consequences for the practice of science (Wagenmakers, 2007) . Bayes factors, 41
by specifying two models, resolve several key problems (though not all problems). After defining a 42
Bayes factor, the introduction first indicates the general consequences of having two models 43 (namely, the ability to obtain evidence for the null hypothesis; and the fact the alternative has to be 44 specified well enough to make predictions). Then the body of the paper explores four ways in which 45 these consequences may change the practice of science for the better. 46
What is a Bayes factor? 47
In order to define a Bayes factor, the following equation can be derived with a few steps 48 from the axioms of probability (e.g. Stone, 2013) : Normative posterior belief in one theory versus 49
another in the light of data = a Bayes factor, B × prior belief in one theory versus another. That is, 50 whatever strength of belief one happened to have in different theories prior to data (which will be 51 different for different people), that belief should be updated by the same amount, B, for everyone 1 .
52
What this equation tells us is that if we measure strength of evidence of data as the amount by 53 which anyone should change their strength of belief in the two theories in the light of the data, then 54 the only relevant information is provided by the Bayes factor, B (cf Birnbaum, 1962) . Conventional 55 approximate guidelines for strength of evidence were provided by Jeffreys (1939;  though Bayes 56 factors stand on their own as continuous measures of degrees of evidence). If B > 3 then there is 57 substantial evidence for H1 rather than H0; if B < 1/3 then there is substantial evidence for H0 rather 58 than H1; and if B is in between 1/3 and 3 then the evidence is insensitive. 59
The term 'prior' has two meanings in the context of Bayes factors. P(H1) is a prior probability 60 of H1, i.e. how much you believe in H1 before seeing the data. But the term 'prior' is also used to 61 refer to setting up the model of H1, i.e. to state what the theory predicts, used for obtaining P(D|H1), 62 the probability of obtaining the data given the theory. When measuring strength of evidence with 63
Bayes factors, there is no need to specify priors in the first sense; but there is a need to specify a 64 model (prior in the second sense). To know how much evidence supports a theory one must know 65 what the theory predicts; but one doesn't have to know how much one believes in a theory a priori. 66
In this paper, specifying what a theory predicts will be called a 'model'. 67
The consequences of having two models 68
1 In symbols: P(H1|D) / P(H0|D) = P(D|H1) / P(D|H0) × P(H1)/P(H0) P(H1)/P(H0) is the ratio of the probabilities (or strength of belief) in H1 versus H0, i.e. the prior odds of H1 versus H0. P(H1/D)/P(H0|D) is the ratio of the probabilities of the two theories in the light of the data; i.e. the posterior odds. The remaining term is the Bayes factor, B, which states that the data are B times more probable under H1 rather than H0. Briefly, posterior odds = B × prior odds.
The specification of two models in a Bayesian approach, rather than one in significance 69 testing, has two direct consequences: One is that Bayes factors are symmetric in a way that p-values 70 are asymmetric; and, second, Bayes factors relate theory to data in a direct way that is not possible 71 with p-values. Here I clarify what these two properties mean; then the paper will consider in detail 72 how these properties are important for how we do science. 73
First, a Bayes factor, unlike a p-value, is a continuous degree of evidence that can 74 symmetrically favour one model or another (e.g. Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009 ). 75
Let's call the models H1 and H0. By using conventional criteria, the Bayes factor can indicate 76 whether evidence is weak or strong. Thus, the Bayes factor may indicate (i) strong evidence for H1 77 and against H0; or (ii) strong evidence for H0 and against H1; or (iii) not much evidence either way. 78
That is a Bayes factor can make a three-way distinction. A p-value, by contrast, is asymmetric. A 79 small p-value (often) indicates evidence against H0 and for the H1 of interest; but a large p-value 80 does not distinguish evidence for H0 from not much evidence for anything. A p-value only tries to 81 make a two-way distinction: evidence against H0 (i.e. i) versus anything else (i.e. ii or iii, without 82 distinguishing them) (and even this it does not do very well; Lindley, 1957) . A large p-value is, 83 therefore, never in itself evidence for H0. The asymmetry of p-values leads to many problems that 84 are part of the 'credibility crisis' in science (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012) . The reason why p-values 85 are asymmetric is that they specify only one model: H0. This is their simplicity and hence their 86 beguiling beauty. But their simplicity is simplistic. This paper will argue that using Bayes factors will 87 therefore help solve some (but not all) of the problems leading to the credibility crisis, by changing 88 scientific practice. The symmetry is particularly important in determining support for the null 89 hypothesis, interpreting replications, and p-hacking by optional stopping, all practical issues 90 discussed below. 91
The strict use of only one model is Fisherian; Neyman and Pearson (1967) argued that two 92 models should be used, and introduced the concept of power, which helps introduce symmetry in 93 inference, in that it provides grounds for asserting the null hypothesis. Unfortunately power is a 94 flawed solution (Dienes, 2014) and that might explain why it is not always taken up. Power cannot 95 be determined based on the actual data in order to assess their sensitivity; hence, a high powered 96 non-significant result might not actually be evidence for the null hypothesis, as we shall see. Further, 97 it involves (or should involve) specifying only the minimal interesting effect size, which is a rather 98 incomplete specification of H1 (and it is the aspect of H1 most difficult to make in many cases). In 99 practice, psychologists are happy to assert null hypotheses even when power has not been 100 calculated, and inference is based on p-values alone (as we shall see). 101
The second consequence of having to specify H1 as well as H0 is that thought must be given 102 to what one's theory actually predicts (Vanpaemel, 2010 B is driven in opposite directions dependent on which theory is true, when using a Bayes factor one 223 can stop collecting data whenever one likes (Savage, 1962 A useful rule would be to stop collecting data when either B is greater than 3 or less than 1/3; 228 then one has guaranteed an informative conclusion with a minimum number of participants (cf. 229 Schoenbrodt, Wagenmakers, Zehetleitner, & Perugini, in press). (Something which power cannot 230 guarantee: A study can be high-powered but still the data do not discriminate between the models.) 231
While significance testing allows p-hacking by optional stopping, one cannot B-hack by optional 232 stopping. 233
The possibility that one can legitimately ignore the stopping rule would be such a dramatic 234 and useful change to practice, that it might seem too good to be true. Consider the following 235 argument for why the conclusion might be false. The value of B, as any statistic, is subject to noise, 236 and surely one can capitalize on that noise by stopping for example when B > 3 (if it were to be), 237 even when H0 is true? Indeed, Yu, Sprenger, Thomas, and Dougherty (2014) and Sanborn and Hills 238 (2014) showed that one could indeed substantially raise the false alarm rate for B when H0 was true 239
by using just such a stopping rule. The effect can be illustrated even with a symmetric stopping rule. 240
Imagine an experiment where each participant provides a difference score, say their cognitive 241 performance with and without a cognitive enhancer. We have prior information that implies that if 242 there were to be an effect of a cognitive enhancer, it would be about one point for the dependent 243 variable used. Following Dienes (2014), H1 is modelled as a half-normal with an SD of the expected 244 size of effect (i.e. 1). For simplicity, assume the population standard deviation of scores is 1. When 245 running for a fixed 100 trials, simulation of the experiment 1000 times (see Appendix 1 for details) 246
showed that when H0 was true, B exceeded three 1% of the time, and B was less than a third 86% of 247 the time. That is the false alarm rate was only 1%. 248 Table 1 indicates what happened when the stopping rule was as follows: After every 249 participant, check to see if either B > 3 or else B < 1/3. I f so, stop. Otherwise run another participant 250 and continue until either the threshold is crossed or else 100 subjects are reached. In terms of 251 researcher practice, this is a worst case scenario; researchers do not typically check after every 252 participant, but maybe only two or three times when the initial result is non-significant; see Dienes 253
Dienes (2011) has been represented as a half-normal, with mode = 0, and SD = 1). Each participant provides a 269 single difference score, sampled from a normal distribution with a standard deviation of 1. Thus, the 270 specified population effect sizes are dz's (Cohen, 1988) . Maximum number of participants before 271 stopping (MaxN) = 100; minimum number of participants before checking after every trial (MinN) = 1. 272 H0 is rejected if B exceeds the stated threshold, and accepted if B goes below 1/threshold. 273
274
Why the stopping rule is a not a problem for Bayes factors. Rouder (2014) argued elegantly for why 275 the sensitivity of the false alarm rate to the stopping rule is consistent with inference from B 276 remaining immune to the stopping rule. Here the same argument will be put slightly differently. First 277 notice that the equation 'posterior odds = B*prior odds' follows from the axioms of probability. 278
That is, given that the axioms normatively specify how the strength of belief should be changed, B is 279 normatively the amount by which the strength of belief should be changed regardless of the 280 stopping rule. If strength of evidence is measured by how much in principle beliefs should 281 normatively be changed, then B is normatively the measure of strength of evidence discriminating 282 two theories. The stopping rule does not come into the equation, so the claim is true regardless of 283 the stopping rule. But how does this fit with false alarm changing according to the stopping rule? 284
Notice that B is the measure of evidence regardless of the specific value of P(D|H0). That is, 285 P(D|H0) can in principle vary as B stays the same. B will still be the measure of strength of evidence 286 -because P(D|H1) will change by just the right amount. Experimental psychologists are used to 287 such reasoning with signal detection theory. Discriminability in a perceptual decision task can remain 288 the same as bias changes; we would never dream of measuring discriminability by measuring the 289 false alarm rate in a signal detection experiment. Obviously the same point applies to H0 versus H1. 290
That is, false alarm rate of a procedure can change when discriminating H0 versus H1 even when the 291 ability of the procedure to discriminate remains invariant. The evidence provided by an observation 292 remains the same even if the criterion is changed (and hence false alarm rate changes Bayes factors for optional stopping. One can vary, amongst other things, the threshold, population 302 effect sizes, and the minimum or maximum number of participants before optional stopping can 303 begin. Table 2 shows the same situation as Table 1 , but with a minimum of 10 participants before 304 optional stopping could start. The false alarm rate for a threshold of three is halved (see first column 305
in Table 2 compared to Table 1 ). B will be most variable early on in testing, because B is driven in 306 different directions according to which theory is true as data accumulates. Once B has picked up 307 momentum in the right direction, it may never exceed a value in the opposite direction, even after 308 an infinite number of participants (Savage, 1962 An example is now presented in order to consider the issue of families of tests. Six studies 384 are run testing the effect of referring to the general concept of "closing" on how quickly a sale is 385 closed (i.e. how quickly the sale is agreed and completed). The maximum time allocated to the sale 386 was 5 minutes in each study. A previous priming study using a the same selling paradigm, but 387 priming by seating the client in soft vs hard chairs, obtained a priming effect of 15 seconds. Thus, 388 based on the past study, in the current experiment one might expect a priming effect of on the order 389 of magnitude of roughly 15 seconds if priming existed (so we can model H1 as a half normal with an 390 SD of 15 seconds, following Dienes 2014). In one study frequent verbal reference was made by the 391 salesperson to closed doors compared to a control condition; in another condition the salesperson 392 incidentally discussed Sunday closing rules; and, for example, in the final study, the salesperson 393 made frequent hand gestures reminiscent of a closing door. Each condition had its own matched 394 5 It may seem that the Bayesian solution of weighting according to participant number is open to the frequentist; indeed, the frequentist may complain that the solution I provide above is just as frequentist as Bayesian. But the frequentist is conceptually obliged to respect reference classes even in meta-analyses. Consider Smith performing a study which obtained p = .08 and publishing. Jones, based on Smith's p-value being tantalizing close to .05, runs 20 more participants, and combines the data together in a meta-analysis. The resulting meta-analytic p =.04 is not significant at the 5% level just because it was Jones who topped up and not Smith (see section 2.1 1; so long as Jones topping up is conditional on the p-value obtained by Smith, the overall error rate of the Jones-Smith pair is above 5%). Frequentists may intuitively grasp for Bayesian solutions, but that does not make the frequentist version legitimate (for a similar argument for confidence vs credibility intervals, see Morey The strategy suggested so far relies on using a Bayes factor to test a single degree-of-493 freedom hypothesis. This provides a simple broadly applicable strategy but the use of Bayes factors 494
is not limited to this strategy. A superordinate theory that specifies a rank ordering of means in 495 different conditions can also be tested with a Bayes factor using the methods of Hoijtink (2011). For 496 example, a theory that specified that the mean for the first and second conditions should be the 497 same but higher than those from a third, specifies a set of ordinal constraints which together are 498 richer than a single degree-of-freedom comparison. An editor might be especially prepared to 499 accept a paper in favour of or against a superordinate theory if the theory received substantial 500 evidence as a whole (either for or against), regardless of the direction of specific cherry-picked 501 comparisons. Of course, the single degree of freedom comparisons (first mean versus second mean; 502 their average versus the third) would help pinpoint strength of evidence for specific claims made by 503 the theory. 504
So far it might be thought that Bayes does little better than significance testing in dealing 505 with multiple testing situations (after all, in orthodox statistics one could combine evidence across 506 situations in theory relevant ways). Bear in mind that in Bayesian inference one is not at liberty to 507 define families at will; one has to ask about the relation of data to each specific theory of interest, so 508 "families" must be picked out as the tests relevant to a given theory. Bayesian inference can indicate 509 the support for or against any specified theory. But Bayesian inference can do more, by taking into 510 account the full Bayesian apparatus that lies beyond non-Bayesian approaches. A Bayes factor 511 represents the strength of evidence data provides for one theory rather than another. That evidence 512 informs the posterior probabilities for the different theories. The posterior probability that 513 embodied priming of closure is effective may be affected by the evidence for priming using words; 514 that is, if there is priming for words it increases the probability that there could be priming from 515 gestures, and vice versa. The evidence from the other studies, using different priming procedures, 516 may rationally affect the posterior probability of any one of the priming techniques working. This is 517 because these specific theories fall under the same general theory. Gelman, Carlin, Stern, Dunson et 518 al. (2013) and Kruschke (2010) describe how to set up hierarchical models whereby the posterior 519 distributions of the means of different conditions is automatically influenced by the data from all 520
conditions. This has the effect of making it harder to detect an effect of embodied priming if there 521
were no priming in any other condition (cf correction for multiple testing); but easier if there were 522 priming in other conditions. This rational adjustment cannot be done with non-Bayesian approaches. 523
In essence the procedure provides a sort of correction for multiple testing -but not for the sake of 524 correcting for multiple testing, but for the sake of making the most of all the relevant data 8
. 525
In sum, significance testing involves arbitrary corrections for multiple testing, where there is 526 no need to define families by the theory the data are relevant to (indeed, people are often urged to 527 define families by other criteria, like omnibus degrees of freedom in pre-packaged statistical 528 routines such as ANOVA ). Bayes factors (where H1 is motivated by theory) explicitly relate theories 529 to data. It may be that specific theory receives support while a general theory is weakened (or vice 530 versa)
. That is what the data say; what to do next is a matter for scientific not statistical judgment. 531
Bayesian inference would change scientific practice because calculating a Bayes factor requires 532 specifying two models, and thus encourages being clear about what theory the data bear on. Thus, 533
families cannot be defined arbitrarily, but only by reference to theories of scientific interest. 534 535
Planned versus post hoc tests. 536
First we consider the problem, that the timing of theory relative to data intuitively feels important, 537 yet correcting for it introduces inferential arbitrariness; then we consider the Bayesian solution, 538 which removes arbitrariness. 539
The problem. One intuition is that it is desirable to predict the precise results one obtained in 540 advance of obtaining them. Indeed, in an estimated 92% of papers in psychology and psychiatry, the 541 results confirm the predictions (Fanelli, 2010 ). Yet when the predictions are made in advance of 542 seeing the data, the confirmation rate is considerably less (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). 543
Scientists feel a pressure to obtain confirmatory results. For significance testing it makes a 544 difference whether one thought of one's theory before analysing the data or afterwards (planned 545 versus post hoc comparisons). In Bayesian inference all that matters are the data and the theory, not 546 their timing (because the Bayes factor depends just on the probability of the data given the theory). 547
At first, the Bayesian answer might seem strange. We have all read papers where when we 548 got to the end of the introduction and read the "predictions", we thought "You are only saying that 549
because that is what your results are." We feel cheated. A post hoc result is being falsely treated as 550 a prediction. Isn't this wrong? But wait a minute. You knew there was a problem just by reading 551 what you had in front of you. That shows the real problem existed independently of the timing of 552 events; the real problem was the relation of predictions to theory as evident in the paper itself. 553
What really matters is how tightly and simply predictions follow from a simple and elegant theory. 554
Those criteria are obviously not met by our example paper. The paper would be flawed just as much 555 even if, in fact, the authors had thought of their predictions before looking at the data. The data are 556 not actually likely given any stated general theory -that's the problem. Opposite or different 557 predictions could just as well be generated from the stated general theory (if any theory were 558 stated). Consider an opposite case: Einstein finding that his theory of general theory, developed 559 around 1915, explained the anomalous orbit of Mercury, known since 1859. It was a key result that 560 helped win scientists over to his theory (Lanczos, 1974) . First the result was known, then the theory 561 was developed. But the theory had its own independent elegant motivation. What is important is 562 the theory's simplicity and elegance both in itself and in application to the results, not which came 563 first. 564
The role of timing in Bayesian inference. Timing is a proxy or correlate of what we are really 565 interested in: Predictions genuinely made in advance are likely to be strongly motivated by a simple 566 theory. Post hoc predictions are likely to be arbitrarily related to simple theory. A useful rule of 567 thumb is that confirming novel rather than post hoc predictions is more likely to provide strong 568 evidence for a simple theory. But that is not to do with some magic about when someone thought 569 of a theory (someone's brilliance in mentally penetrating the structure of Mother Nature in advance 570 may be relevant to their self-esteem but such personal brilliance does not transfer to the evidential 571 support of the data for the theory: In science it does not matter who you are). The objective 572
properties of theory and data as entities in their own right (Feynman, 1998; Popper, 1963) In considering what a general theory predicts in order to calculate the Bayes factor, one 580 might be tempted to use the obtained data to refine the estimate of the magnitude of the prediction 581 for those very same data. That is the Bayesian way of cheating. The data are thereby "double 582 counted", once for connecting theory to predictions, then again for considering whether the 583 predictions are confirmed, and so involve a violation of the axioms of probability (Jeffreys, 1939; 584 Jaynes, 2003) . Double counting has to be evaluated with respect to whether the axioms of 585 probability are violated. For example, the general theory that 'priming occurs in this context' cannot 586 be evaluated by using the obtained data to specify what the theory predicts (and then using the 587 same data to test the predictions of the general theory). So what about if one found the Bayes factor 588 not for the general theory but for a specific theory specifying the magnitude of the effect, which 589 happened to be the magnitude shown in the data? That is now OK. All that matters is the probability 590 of the data given the theory; where the theory came from does not matter, according to the 591 principles of Bayesian inference. ensures the public availability of all results that are pre-registered, regardless of the pattern, which is 604 important for all approaches to statistical inference, Bayesian or otherwise (Goldacre, 2013) . This 605 alone is sufficient to justify an extensive use of pre-registered reports. In addition, pre-registration 606 may help us judge such things as simplicity and elegance of theory more objectively. How much 607 judgments of the properties of theory and their relation to predictions are affected by knowing the 608 results in a naturalistic scientific context needs to be investigated further, but it is likely to be a 609 substantial factor, perhaps moderated by experience (Arkes, 2013; Slovic, & Fischhoff, 1977) . This is 610
an extra-statistical consideration that does not undermine the direct conclusions that follow from a 611
Bayesian analysis (how well a theory is supported by data relative to another theory), but does raise 612 the issue of the context of scientific judgments within which those conclusions are embedded. 613
Finally, and very importantly, pre-registration helps deal with the problem of analytic 614 flexibility (Chambers, 2015 full analysis method in advance, it will, with 90% probability, be one of the nine methods supporting 623 H0. Thus, with pre-registration the Bayesian analysis is more likely to reflect the overall message of 624 the data. Note that in this case as well, the timing of predictions is just a proxy for the real thing; 625 what actually matters are the objective properties of the data as they are. If by fluke (and it will 626 sometimes happen) the pre-registered analysis method was the one method that did not obtain 627 support for H0, the Bayesian analysis now fails to reflect the overall message of the data, even 628 though the method was pre-registered. Thus, having all data transparently available must also be 629 part of the solution. Then anyone with the time can check different ways of analysing the data for 630 themselves. And in any argument that ensues, it may be worth bearing in mind that the pre-631 registered method is likely, but is not guaranteed, to reflect what the data say on balance. 632
The argument for pre-registration is particularly compelling for fMRI. Carp One problem with using Bayes factors is precisely that the psychological theory could be 683 translated to several models; yet the support indicated by any given Bayes factor strictly refers to 684 the model not the theory. Thus, the distribution in the model needs to have those properties that 685 capture relevant predictions of the theory in context, while the distribution's other properties 686
should not alter the qualitative conclusion drawn from the resulting Bayes factor. If the outcome is 687 robust to large distributional changes (while respecting the implementation of the same theory), the 688 distributions are acceptable for use in Bayes factors, and the conclusion transfers to the theory (cf 689 Good, 1983) . This is referred to as robustness checking. For example if the application of a theory to 690 an experiment indicates that the raw maximum difference should not be more than about m, then 691 try simple distributions that satisfy this judgement yet change their shapes in other ways: Dienes 692
(2014) suggests a uniform from 0 to m; a half-normal with mode 0 and standard deviation m/2; and 693 a normal with mean m/2 and standard deviation m/4. In all cases the (at least rough) maximum is m 694 yet in one case the distribution is flat, in another the probability is pushed up to one side, and in 695 another peaked in the middle. If the qualitative conclusions remain unaltered, the conclusion carries 696 from the models to the theory. A different approach may be to declare in advance which distribution 697 will be used (with reasons) on the grounds such a distribution is likely to reflect the conclusion from 698 most simple representations of the theory (see section 2.4 improves error rates for inference by intervals. Table 5 shows the improvement for requiring 10 921 participants to be run before optional stopping occurs as compared to table 4. Still the error rates 922 are higher than those for Bayes factors shown in Table 2 . 923 
